MAP has hosted a series of virtual events in Summer 2020! Check below for more information.
FLASH TALKS
Third Wednesday of every month (May 20, June 17, July 14, August 19)
2pm-3:30pm EDT At each session, we'll hear talks from two MAP affiliates! Interested in giving a flash talk? Submit your abstract here! Submissions are ongoing. RSVP here for the Zoom link: https://forms.gle/EysnxGwsxc1L7HjY6 |
Previous flash talks (contact us for links to the Zoom recordings):
Dee Payton (Rutgers), "Gender Metaphysics"
The metaphysics of gender is a rich and rapidly expanding area of analytic philosophy. The present essay takes up one of its core questions, what is it to be of gender g?, and argues that there are actually two very closely related, but nevertheless distinct questions in the area of this one sentence. The first is a question about language: what does the term 'g' mean? The second is a question about metaphysics: which property is g? These two questions are not asking after the same thing, or so I will argue. Furthermore, once we distinguish these questions, another question arises regarding the relationship (if any) between our answers to each. My aim in this essay is not to provide definitive answers to these questions, but instead to make the case for asking them each independently, and considering them in relation to one another.
J.M. Wong (Penn State), "Urgent Sharing and Vulnerability: a Critique of Social Media Allyship"
Non-Black people have become very active on social media in the wake of the murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police. Newsfeeds are flooded with reports of Black death, anti-racist reading lists and opinion pieces about how to be ‘good allies.’ I suspect some, if not a lot, of this increased activity is a type of moral performance that I term urgent sharing. Urgent sharing originates in an individualistic moral framework, which demands moral performance of non-Black people to prove to others, and ultimately themselves, that they are not racist, which is to say not bad. But not only do urgent sharers perform goodness; they perform vulnerability.
Meanwhile, Black people are materially vulnerable, facing threats of violence and death. Moreover, Black people experience social vulnerability when they articulate that they are un-free in an anti-Black society. By urgent sharing, non-Black people feign vulnerability. This is a problem because social and political vulnerability is essential in removing racism as it manifests as an epistemic limitation. This epistemic limitation hampers non-black allies from ever really becoming allies at all. An ally can only help fight racism after they change their epistemic orientation away from racism and towards anti-racism and anti-oppression. That is a socially and politically vulnerable position—particularly in a liberal society with an individualistic moral framework—because it requires grappling with the extent to which one is racist and lives with a racist worldview.
Alexandra Lloyd (CU Boulder), "#MeToo, Moral Encroachment, & Asymmetric Stakes"
I propose and defend an amendment to moral encroachment. I argue that the evidential threshold for outright belief should be sensitive not only to the moral costs of falsely believing, but also the moral costs of failing to believe truly. I focus on #MeToo cases and argue that women are harmed when their allegations of sexual misconduct are not truly believed. Consistency with what motivated moral encroachment in the first place therefore demands that the high stakes of failing to truly believe can lower the evidential threshold for outright belief.
Yingshihan Zhu (CUNY), "The Moral Obligation to Resist Complacency with Respect to One's Own Oppression"
While many philosophers have highlighted important reasons to resist one’s own oppression, they tend to overlook the phenomenon of complacency. This paper addresses this gap by considering whether there is a moral obligation to resist complacency with respect to one’s own oppression. On my account, complacent members of oppressed groups exhibit the following three individually necessary and jointly sufficient features: they take insufficient actions of resistance; they are self-satisfied; and they are epistemically culpable. I refer to these individuals as the “complacent oppressed.” I contend that the oppressed are obligated to resist complacency with respect to their own oppression because failing to do so would inflict or allow significant harm to both themselves and others. While the obligation to resist complacency follows from the obligation to resist one’s own oppression, I will argue that focusing on the obligation to combat complacency in its own right is useful for at least two reasons. First, complacency is a distinctive kind of phenomenon that cannot be subsumed in the broad category of inaction because inaction alone does not render a person complacent. Second, focusing on the obligation to resist complacency also fills in a gap within at least one of the most prominent theories of resisting oppression.
Arnel Blake Batoon (UCSB), "Epistemic Entitlement and the Linguistic Basis for Truthfulness"
Non-reductionists say that our testimony based beliefs are default justified. However, whether it is rational to assert truth depends on the speaker’s practical context. If so, it is unclear how testimony based beliefs are default justified. Many non-reductionists respond that the nature of assertion engenders a normative (e.g., rational) asymmetry favoring truthfulness over deceitfulness. I argue that these responses fail because they conflate a speaker’s functioning normally with its functioning properly; proper function explanations of warranted assertion and justified testimony based belief must account for what is optimal given the speaker’s practical context.
Tez Clark (NYU), "Moral Understanding and Moral Worth"
Why should we value or seek out moral understanding? One view that has gained prominence in the literature argues that moral understanding is important because it’s closely tied to the performance of morally worthy actions—that is, right actions that are done for the right reasons. In this paper, I’ll argue against this view. I’ll argue that the prospect of moral worth isn’t a good reason to seek moral understanding, because doing so is self-undermining—an agent who actively seeks out moral worth isn’t doing something morally worthy. Moreover, I’ll argue, moral understanding isn’t necessary for performing morally worthy actions. If I’m right, this result also has implications for moral epistemology—as the supposed connection between moral understanding and moral worth is often invoked as a reason why we shouldn’t defer to moral testimony.
Rose Bell (Syracuse), "What is (Authentic) Gender Normativity?"
Talk of “gender norms” is common in feminist, queer, and trans philosophies. However, there is almost no research at the intersection between these projects and the metaethical literature on normativity. I seek to investigate the usefulness of theories of normativity for making sense of pertinent issues surrounding gender norms. Primarily, I want to explain relative gender norm authenticity. Some people experience gender norms as exerting competing demands on them, one of which feels more authentic. For example, a transfeminine person might feel they ought to comply with some masculine norm because it is socially mandated, but also that they ought to comply with some incompatible feminine norm because it represents “who they really are” in a way that the masculine norm does not. Can we explain this kind of relative authenticity claim while maintaining commitment to the social construction of gender norms? I suggest that metaethical theories of constructivism, which ground “authoritative” normative force in facts about agents themselves, can help us make sense of this. A gender norm can be more authentic for some agent if the content of that norm matches facts about the agent better than other norms which might apply to them.
Sumeet Patwardhan (Michigan), "Let's Stop Sulking Each Other Into Sex"
Nonphysical sexual pressure tactics, such as sulking, badgering, and so on, are not only frequent, but also frequently deemed to be forms of coercion that invalidate sexual consent. Yet, Alan Wertheimer and Sarah Conly have argued that such tactics are not consent-invalidating. In this paper, I focus on the case of sulking. I argue that once we understand what sulking into sex is, and what coercion is, we will see that sulking into sex can in fact be coercive in a way that invalidates sexual consent. The gist of my argument is this. First, sexual consent is invalidated by coercion when (1) A negligently leads B to believe that A will wrong B unless B has sex with A and (2) B truly prefers to have sex than to face A’s threatened wrong. Second, sulking into sex can involve blaming someone for not having sex. Third, blaming someone for not having sex is (almost) always wrong. And fourth, people can truly prefer to have sex than to face someone's sulking. Sulked-into sex, then, can be non-consensual sex. I hope my arguments lead us to take sulking, and similar nonphysical pressure tactics, more seriously than we currently do.
Dee Payton (Rutgers), "Gender Metaphysics"
The metaphysics of gender is a rich and rapidly expanding area of analytic philosophy. The present essay takes up one of its core questions, what is it to be of gender g?, and argues that there are actually two very closely related, but nevertheless distinct questions in the area of this one sentence. The first is a question about language: what does the term 'g' mean? The second is a question about metaphysics: which property is g? These two questions are not asking after the same thing, or so I will argue. Furthermore, once we distinguish these questions, another question arises regarding the relationship (if any) between our answers to each. My aim in this essay is not to provide definitive answers to these questions, but instead to make the case for asking them each independently, and considering them in relation to one another.
J.M. Wong (Penn State), "Urgent Sharing and Vulnerability: a Critique of Social Media Allyship"
Non-Black people have become very active on social media in the wake of the murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police. Newsfeeds are flooded with reports of Black death, anti-racist reading lists and opinion pieces about how to be ‘good allies.’ I suspect some, if not a lot, of this increased activity is a type of moral performance that I term urgent sharing. Urgent sharing originates in an individualistic moral framework, which demands moral performance of non-Black people to prove to others, and ultimately themselves, that they are not racist, which is to say not bad. But not only do urgent sharers perform goodness; they perform vulnerability.
Meanwhile, Black people are materially vulnerable, facing threats of violence and death. Moreover, Black people experience social vulnerability when they articulate that they are un-free in an anti-Black society. By urgent sharing, non-Black people feign vulnerability. This is a problem because social and political vulnerability is essential in removing racism as it manifests as an epistemic limitation. This epistemic limitation hampers non-black allies from ever really becoming allies at all. An ally can only help fight racism after they change their epistemic orientation away from racism and towards anti-racism and anti-oppression. That is a socially and politically vulnerable position—particularly in a liberal society with an individualistic moral framework—because it requires grappling with the extent to which one is racist and lives with a racist worldview.
Alexandra Lloyd (CU Boulder), "#MeToo, Moral Encroachment, & Asymmetric Stakes"
I propose and defend an amendment to moral encroachment. I argue that the evidential threshold for outright belief should be sensitive not only to the moral costs of falsely believing, but also the moral costs of failing to believe truly. I focus on #MeToo cases and argue that women are harmed when their allegations of sexual misconduct are not truly believed. Consistency with what motivated moral encroachment in the first place therefore demands that the high stakes of failing to truly believe can lower the evidential threshold for outright belief.
Yingshihan Zhu (CUNY), "The Moral Obligation to Resist Complacency with Respect to One's Own Oppression"
While many philosophers have highlighted important reasons to resist one’s own oppression, they tend to overlook the phenomenon of complacency. This paper addresses this gap by considering whether there is a moral obligation to resist complacency with respect to one’s own oppression. On my account, complacent members of oppressed groups exhibit the following three individually necessary and jointly sufficient features: they take insufficient actions of resistance; they are self-satisfied; and they are epistemically culpable. I refer to these individuals as the “complacent oppressed.” I contend that the oppressed are obligated to resist complacency with respect to their own oppression because failing to do so would inflict or allow significant harm to both themselves and others. While the obligation to resist complacency follows from the obligation to resist one’s own oppression, I will argue that focusing on the obligation to combat complacency in its own right is useful for at least two reasons. First, complacency is a distinctive kind of phenomenon that cannot be subsumed in the broad category of inaction because inaction alone does not render a person complacent. Second, focusing on the obligation to resist complacency also fills in a gap within at least one of the most prominent theories of resisting oppression.
Arnel Blake Batoon (UCSB), "Epistemic Entitlement and the Linguistic Basis for Truthfulness"
Non-reductionists say that our testimony based beliefs are default justified. However, whether it is rational to assert truth depends on the speaker’s practical context. If so, it is unclear how testimony based beliefs are default justified. Many non-reductionists respond that the nature of assertion engenders a normative (e.g., rational) asymmetry favoring truthfulness over deceitfulness. I argue that these responses fail because they conflate a speaker’s functioning normally with its functioning properly; proper function explanations of warranted assertion and justified testimony based belief must account for what is optimal given the speaker’s practical context.
Tez Clark (NYU), "Moral Understanding and Moral Worth"
Why should we value or seek out moral understanding? One view that has gained prominence in the literature argues that moral understanding is important because it’s closely tied to the performance of morally worthy actions—that is, right actions that are done for the right reasons. In this paper, I’ll argue against this view. I’ll argue that the prospect of moral worth isn’t a good reason to seek moral understanding, because doing so is self-undermining—an agent who actively seeks out moral worth isn’t doing something morally worthy. Moreover, I’ll argue, moral understanding isn’t necessary for performing morally worthy actions. If I’m right, this result also has implications for moral epistemology—as the supposed connection between moral understanding and moral worth is often invoked as a reason why we shouldn’t defer to moral testimony.
Rose Bell (Syracuse), "What is (Authentic) Gender Normativity?"
Talk of “gender norms” is common in feminist, queer, and trans philosophies. However, there is almost no research at the intersection between these projects and the metaethical literature on normativity. I seek to investigate the usefulness of theories of normativity for making sense of pertinent issues surrounding gender norms. Primarily, I want to explain relative gender norm authenticity. Some people experience gender norms as exerting competing demands on them, one of which feels more authentic. For example, a transfeminine person might feel they ought to comply with some masculine norm because it is socially mandated, but also that they ought to comply with some incompatible feminine norm because it represents “who they really are” in a way that the masculine norm does not. Can we explain this kind of relative authenticity claim while maintaining commitment to the social construction of gender norms? I suggest that metaethical theories of constructivism, which ground “authoritative” normative force in facts about agents themselves, can help us make sense of this. A gender norm can be more authentic for some agent if the content of that norm matches facts about the agent better than other norms which might apply to them.
Sumeet Patwardhan (Michigan), "Let's Stop Sulking Each Other Into Sex"
Nonphysical sexual pressure tactics, such as sulking, badgering, and so on, are not only frequent, but also frequently deemed to be forms of coercion that invalidate sexual consent. Yet, Alan Wertheimer and Sarah Conly have argued that such tactics are not consent-invalidating. In this paper, I focus on the case of sulking. I argue that once we understand what sulking into sex is, and what coercion is, we will see that sulking into sex can in fact be coercive in a way that invalidates sexual consent. The gist of my argument is this. First, sexual consent is invalidated by coercion when (1) A negligently leads B to believe that A will wrong B unless B has sex with A and (2) B truly prefers to have sex than to face A’s threatened wrong. Second, sulking into sex can involve blaming someone for not having sex. Third, blaming someone for not having sex is (almost) always wrong. And fourth, people can truly prefer to have sex than to face someone's sulking. Sulked-into sex, then, can be non-consensual sex. I hope my arguments lead us to take sulking, and similar nonphysical pressure tactics, more seriously than we currently do.
MAPPY HOUR
First Thursday of every month (May 7, June 4, July 2, August 6)
8pm-9pm EDT Chat and relax with MAP organizers, affiliates, and alums! RSVP here for the Zoom link: https://forms.gle/uU7w7nUfYjEuWmFGA |
WORKSHOP: CRAFTING AN ALTERNATIVE SPACE: STUDENT-CENTERED PEDAGOGICAL STRATEGIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
Feel free to contact us for the recording.
Speakers: Àger Pérez Casanovas and MAP organizers at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
RSVP here for the Zoom link: https://forms.gle/x5cJEdsraWKkcH2JA
Share the love on Facebook!: https://www.facebook.com/events/1090420287985135/
Abstract
The aim of this workshop is to put forward strategies to create an impactful student-based curriculum that takes into account the historical, social, political, and economic specificities of learning environments. The workshop, hosted by members of the MAP chapter at UAB (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), will explore how the group has functioned throughout its first active semester. The UAB MAP chapter consists of a Spanish-speaking group of students who come from different backgrounds across Spain and South-America. The first MAP reading group, devoted to Decolonialism and Philosophy, attempted to introduce into the syllabus issues that shaped and affected the students’ context and the way they take part in it. We will discuss how Decolonialism can act as more than a theoretical critical approach, becoming a methodology to understand the apparatus of education. From the context of UAB, we will also put forward questions of how we inhabit Higher Education institutions outside the English-speaking hegemony, and how this exteriority affects our reading lists
Speakers: Àger Pérez Casanovas and MAP organizers at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
RSVP here for the Zoom link: https://forms.gle/x5cJEdsraWKkcH2JA
Share the love on Facebook!: https://www.facebook.com/events/1090420287985135/
Abstract
The aim of this workshop is to put forward strategies to create an impactful student-based curriculum that takes into account the historical, social, political, and economic specificities of learning environments. The workshop, hosted by members of the MAP chapter at UAB (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), will explore how the group has functioned throughout its first active semester. The UAB MAP chapter consists of a Spanish-speaking group of students who come from different backgrounds across Spain and South-America. The first MAP reading group, devoted to Decolonialism and Philosophy, attempted to introduce into the syllabus issues that shaped and affected the students’ context and the way they take part in it. We will discuss how Decolonialism can act as more than a theoretical critical approach, becoming a methodology to understand the apparatus of education. From the context of UAB, we will also put forward questions of how we inhabit Higher Education institutions outside the English-speaking hegemony, and how this exteriority affects our reading lists